# 1AC Coppell – NTR

#### Plan: The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba.

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**Advantage one is agriculture.**

#### Cuban agriculture is collapsing—now is the key turning point

oil extraction, petrochemicals and oil refinery infrastructure

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(M. Dawn, “Cuban Sustainability: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Agriculture and Energy” per Presentation for the Western Political Science Association Portland, OR, March 21-24, 2012, <http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/kingmdawn.pdf)//HA>

Despite the potential to become more sustainable with a purposive and focused opening of the economy, the recent surge in joint venture investment on expanding domestic oil extraction, petrochemical facilities, and oil refinery infrastructure reveals a trend toward decreasing environmental sustainability. Once heralded as the world’s most sustainable country by coupling environmental performance indicators with their human development scores, Cuba is slipping further away from this goal. Perhaps the most distressing part of this current trend is that it took Cuba decades to create a national identity that embraced sustainable environmental practices in both the energy and agricultural sector, and it seemingly took only a couple of years to derail these efforts. Undoubtedly, conservation efforts and sustainable education programs can only satiate citizen’s energy desires to a certain point. In order to further the quality of life in the country, electric production must increase to rural areas with little energy infrastructure and to Havana in order to spur foreign investment and domestic small business growth. Cuba’s trade agreement with Venezuela is bringing in much-needed petroleum for electricity production, but their dependence on a relatively unstable country for crude is trapping them into the same relationship that crippled their economy in 1990 – impairing their original goal of self-sufficiency. Cuba is at a turning point in their path toward environmental sustainability, and the current need for immediate foreign capital and increased energy production seem to be trumping its desire to achieve development sustainably. Cuba still has enough centralized control to leap-frog dirty electric production for cleaner renewable forms of energy and the potential to guide development strategies that emphasize investments in and research on renewable energy. It can utilize its expertise on organic farming strategies to increase sugar production in a much more ecologically friendly manner than their monoculture approach in the 1970s and 80s. Decisions made in the next five years will demonstrate whether Cuba embraces their newly created national identity as a society striving for sustainable development or rejects the goal of sustainable development to increase short-term capital and energy needs.

#### China and Venezuela ensure failure—only the plan can solve

Dialogue between farmers spread the model

cuba will be forced to abandon the model now

Thompson and Stephens, 12 – \* Ph.D. Curriculum and Education Director @ Duke University AND \*\* Marian Cheek Jackson Center (Charles D. and Alexander, “Visions for Sustainable Agriculture in Cuba and the United States: Changing Minds and Models through Exchange”, Southern States, March 22 2013, <http://www.southernspaces.org/2012/visions-sustainable-agriculture-cuba-and-united-states-changing-minds-and-models-through-exchan>) //SP

With Cuba developing closer ties to the U.S. agriculture industry, increasing its trade with China, and, with Venezuela’s help, poised to explore oil fields off its northern coast, we cannot assume that the island nation will adopt a model of ecological sustainability.9 Resistance to the onslaught of ecologically destructive development that looms on Cuba’s horizon will come through cooperation and exchange, not isolation. What we do know about Cuba’s agricultural innovations is that domestic shortages brought on by the end of Soviet subsidies and the U.S. embargo forced the Cuban government to seek alternative solutions. This entailed ceding some degree of power to its innovative citizen farmers and gardeners who have, in turn, helped create an alternative to industrial agriculture through the formation of organic garden cooperatives known as "organopónicos," local distribution channels, information exchanges, and the like.10 Urban dwellers, many of them university trained, some of them scientists, have joined cooperative gardens in the cities. Working toward sustainability, Cuba’s rural farmers have received new freedoms to produce for more open markets. Such policy changes, along with newly revamped farms and numerous urban gardens, have contributed to a much-needed increase in the country’s food supply since the early 1990s.11 While overall food production in Cuba in 2010 was lower than in 2005, the organic movement coupled with local sales and farmers’ pocketing some of the profit, is one area of progress.12 Opportunities for a Sustainable Future The first stop on our trip was Vívero Alamar, one of the best known organopónicos in Havana, founded by Miguel Salcines Lopez, who also serves as the elected president. He graciously spent a morning with us, beginning by talking about Cuba’s history of agriculture. "Cuba’s first farmers were slaves," Miguel said, and because of this past as well as Cuba’s history of development, people did not want to enter agriculture. Cubans filled the cities, and the countryside soon depended on sugar exports alone. At its height, over 5 million acres were planted in sugarcane, and 160 different refineries dotted the landscape.13 This system created a dependency on one export crop and established a precedent for importing everything else. "The whole diet was based on imported food," Miguel said. When the USSR collapsed and ceased buying sugar at inflated prices—over five times the going international rate—and the U.S. continued its embargo (called a blockade by Cubans) on agricultural and other inputs, Cuba urgently explored ways to produce its own food. "The blockade was beneficial in one way for Cuba," added Miguel, "otherwise the talent would have left." Because of a lack of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery, the island nation turned to organic fertilization and pest control, all run by trained scientists, such as Miguel. "If we hadn’t gone organic, we’d have starved!" The goals were to avoid eating imports and to become self-sufficient in food. We met scores of people, young and old, engaged in harvest. We met a scientist named Marisol, who was conducting a lab experiment involving beneficial insects. We found her bent over a microscope in a small shed in the middle of the fields, her child playing nearby. We saw acres and acres of picture-perfect organic vegetables. Miguel characterized the impressive system they have built as a "biological machine" with everything self-contained. One hundred and eighty-one workers are employed by the garden. We were impressed by the organipónico’s sense of organization, its members’ dedication to having a biologically cyclical operation with no outside inputs, and most of all by the cooperative’s amazing production of healthy vegetables. Miguel claimed they are producing two hundred tons per acre off the plots, and we could see that production was at full-bore in December 2010. The diversity and the extent of crop production result from the number of hands that have carefully infused life into the plots. These gardens stand in sharp contrast to fields worked by machines on commercial farms, and unlike the land on monocultural, industrial farms, which declines in quality, the soil at the organopónico becomes richer with time and layers of vermiculture compost. Miguel and his colleagues are feeding over five thousand weekly, and lines of people form outside the gates daily to purchase the results of their work. "There is much to do," he said. "The market is waiting." There is a long list of people waiting to join the garden project at Vívero Alamar, both for the nutritional benefits and the income. We learned that while the minimum monthly salary in Cuba is around 250 Cuban pesos (approximately 25 Cuban pesos to the American dollar), the minimum brought in by members of the organopónico is 350, with as much as 700 for a number of leaders. While markets function differently in the U.S., similar models should be profitable here. Agriculture researchers are looking for ways to reverse the losses of family farms in the U.S. South by locating organic, sustainable markets. The Center for Environmental Farming Systems (CEFS) in Raleigh, North Carolina, is one of the best examples of a U.S. organization using sustainable agriculture to create jobs and further social justice in economically depressed areas.14 There is a growing market emphasizing "locavorism," with restaurants, cookbooks, and blogs supporting and promoting local foodways. Considering the parallels in their work, it would seem mutually beneficial for groups such as CEFS and Vívero Alamar to cultivate a relationship of exchange. The day after leaving the organopónico we met with Dr. Fernando Funes, internationally recognized leader of the sustainable agriculture movement in Cuba. His son, also Fernando, who increasingly has stepped into his father’s leadership role, told us, "My father was a farmer, and I thought he was backward." Young Fernando changed his mind as he witnessed commercial agriculture using tremendous amounts of fertilizers and other imports and began to realize that local farming knowledge was of critical importance. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, during what came to be called the "Special Period," Cuba was unable to feed its people. This stark situation prompted frantic searches for innovative approaches and an eventual change to biological-intensive—as opposed to chemical-intensive—means of production. The government opened over three hundred agricultural research stations.15 Where urban agriculture had been prohibited previously because of the danger of chemical exposure, Fernando explained, after the policy change the number of gardens immediately shot up to over two hundred. Some 375,000 people joined the ranks of rooftop and vacant lot gardeners. "They were producing something to eat," Fernando said. The government supplied the land and opened channels of distribution. In the first year any new group of gardeners could secure the right to cultivate approximately thirty-three acres and, with success, this could double the next year, and triple in three years to a hundred acres. Dr. Funes published Sustainable Agriculture and Resistance: Transforming Food Production in Cuba with food activist Dr. Peter Rosset (formerly with the U.S. organization Food First), and is widely known as an international ambassador for Cuba’s sustainable agriculture. Funes’ organization, the Asociación Cubana de Agricultura Orgánica (ACAO), received the Right Livelihood Award in 1999. His affability and intelligence drew us in, and we left believing that new leaders and groups would continue to learn from his example.16 The following day we spent with Dr. Humberto Ríos Labrada, of the Cuban National Institute of Agricultural Sciences, and the recipient of the Goldman Prize in 2010 for his community-based research with Cuban farmers. We accompanied Humberto to talk with the "guajiros" (the nickname for people from the Cuban countryside) with whom he works daily. As we drove the four-lane road to Pinar del Rio, Humberto told us his organization works with a network of 55,000 farmers in seed sharing and farm-based research. Charged initially with increasing squash production in Cuba, Humberto began holding meetings with farmers who showed up to participate in an effort to find new seed varieties and improve their yields. Humberto recognized the need to turn the traditional extension model upside down. Instead of the scientists being the "experts", Humberto realized that the farmers themselves cultivated the necessary knowledge and crop diversity. The participation of farmers expanded exponentially, starting with a few hundred and increasing by the thousands. The opportunity to learn from the success of such grassroots organizing campaigns among farmers is another compelling reason for exchange across the Florida Straights. At midday we arrived at the farm of Maria Valido, Agustín Pimental, and their son Royber in Pinar del Rio, near Viñales. Royber, completing his degree in agronomy at the local university, was conducting experiments on the family farm, including one plot with seventy three different varieties of beans. This family and thousands of others like them began alternative agriculture in 2002 with Humberto Ríos’s encouragement. Suddenly farmers were sharing their knowledge and seed varieties together in meetings of campesinos. The family was eager to tell us about their operation, how they came to some of their innovations (Royber’s father had built a methane digester), and how their seeds performed. "Farmers listen with their eyes," said Agustín. By seeing results on other farms, they could duplicate and improve their own work. On this little piece of land, our research team found hope and innovation, and some of the friendliest smiles and open, informed attitudes we had experienced in Latin America. We left glowing, having consumed farm-raised food and taken in a large helping of farm entrepreneurship that included not only experiments with plant breeding and food preservation, but also solar and methane energy production. We took away a feeling that true exchange had taken place, and that we were the primary beneficiaries. If farmers could reach tourists and sell food directly as in the urban casas particulares where we stayed, people would pay handsomely to eat farm-raised food on a farm in place of the typical tourist fare. Humberto had explained that marketing ideas are as important as technical innovations. Miguel Salcines’s ideas for distribution are why many are flocking to join. The Vívero Alamar group has reached thousands of consumers because of the cooperative’s marketing, which includes an attractive farm stand with a cane press where people can buy fresh sugarcane juice as they buy their produce. Necessity is the driving force, but marketing keeps income rolling in for the members. Agritourism has already developed in parts of the U.S. South. Autumn drivers along the Blue Ridge Parkway can see apple orchards filled with tourists picking fruit. Likewise, a chance to try one’s hand at a plow powered by a pair of oxen, for example, might intrigue adventurous tourists in Cuba. Agritourism, of course, is no simple or straightforward solution, as historic experience with tourism and agritourism shows. If farmers and local communities are not in control, tourism could create greater inequalities and exacerbate food insecurity. Therefore any emphasis on tourism has to take into account who owns and controls the local food system. The next morning was Christmas day and we visited a small alley market named Agropecuario Beleu in Havana. We met Osiris Cueto, a buyer/seller who manages a small stall. She taught us how the Cuban agricultural authorities broker the sales of vegetables and fruits. Each seller registers with a market officer, charges a fixed price, and takes a percentage of the profit for the day, paying some of the return to the government. From Osiris we learned why growers would surely welcome the chance to sell directly to consumers. A policy change in December 2011 was supposed to permit just that.17 That afternoon we left on a bus for Trinidad, another UNESCO world heritage site on the south coast. Lacking prior introductions did not seem to matter. The first day, I met Tomás Pérez Ricardo and his uncle on the street corner, selling produce from their small semi-rural organopónico named "Framboyan." Tomás, like the farmers we had met in Pinar del Rio, was gracious, proud of his work, and eager to share both produce and ideas. After visiting his house and farm the next day, I was impressed by how promising this young man believed his garden work to be and how open he was to sharing its message. Riding a horse-drawn cart to town and living in a modest cinderblock house, Tomás had no designs on getting rich, but he saw the possibilities for raising a family on vegetable sales. This sense of hope from agriculture has been a rarity in the developing world. For years, hope for economic prosperity has also eluded many small farmers in the U.S. South. With the growing market for local and sustainably-produced food, the rural U.S. is beginning to benefit from employment associated with sustainable agriculture. And in Cuba, with only 20% of the market supplied by local production, there is plenty of room for more newcomers like Tomás. The next day we drove past thousands of acres of fallow sugarcane fields on our way to yet another UNESCO world heritage site, the Valley of the Ingenios (sugarcane mills) and specifically to the Manaca Iznaga estate. A tower, constructed for overseeing slaves in the fields nearly two centuries earlier, still looms over the old plantation. In the nearby garden of Organopónico Primero de Mayo, I could see the tower, as the ancestors of former slaves worked at a site of cooperation and member ownership. I imagined how non-profits working with former sharecropping families in the Mississippi Delta and Appalachia could find this model relevant. The garden at Primero de Mayo grows eight kinds of vegetables with seeds supplied by the state. Ten members share the proceeds of the produce sold in the streets. The vice-president of the cooperative garden, Pedro Rodriguez Pérez, explained that while the government supplied the land and seeds, the more the members sell, the more they make. The cooperative pays a percentage back to the government, but there is incentive in reaching more customers. The model is not yet generating enough income to allow farm families to have economic autonomy from state subsidies (the same is true of U.S. farmers). Even so, I appreciated watching a grandfather and grandson working side-by-side on land over which they had some say. The tradition of acquiring agricultural knowledge via parent or grandparent remains alive in Cuba in a way that it does not in most parts of the United States. This is largely because of efforts by organizations of small farmers between the Revolution and the Special Period.18 After spending the next night in Havana, we set out for Viñales. We had seen the edge of the region before, but had not quite reached the valley and round hills that appear in so many photographs, the actual location designated as the world heritage site. Our most important goal there was to meet farmers and, based on our previous experiences, we trusted we would find people willing to talk. We met an energetic young farmer named Noél Parrapito our first day there. For two days he took us through the Viñales Valley where we met ten other farmers, sampled their tobacco, ate their produce and home-raised chicken, and learned about their animal husbandry—from their close work with oxen to their horseback riding skills and horse carts. Those skills, juxtaposed with solar technology, water purification, and a generally high literacy rate, spoke of something more than harkening back to yesteryear. Time-after-time when we explained that we were from the United States, our acquaintances replied with both warmth and surprise: warmth because of an association with so many family members and former neighbors who now live there; and surprise because no one from the U.S. had ever visited them before. I found myself thinking at those times how lucky we were to be there—to be the first Americans to go there—knowing how much damage tourism as mentioned on the PBS Nature program had done in other places. I felt sadness as well, knowing how much the indigenous knowledge that these farmers possess was all but inaccessible to thousands of young people in the United States. This feeling was particularly acute because the farmers we met struck me as keenly interested in exchanging knowledge and ideas. With Noél, with whom we shared several meals and lots of conversation while on horseback, we talked about "agritourism." How many people would pay to live on his farm, learn to work with oxen, and cultivate rice, corn, and the huge variety of animals and vegetables he produces? He perked up at the idea and wanted me to repeat the word the next day. He was a patient teacher, showing us every insect, plant, cave, and soil type we passed in the Valley. Could farmers begin to rent their homes to visitors, a program already allowed by the government in urban areas? Could visitors work on the cooperative garden projects with innovators like Miguel Salcines and learn biological farming techniques? Could agritourism fit with the Viñales Valley model? And if it works in Cuba, what are the opportunities for us in the U.S. South to learn through exchange? Too often in the United States, the people who are trying to combine sustainable agriculture and tourism were not raised in these traditions. There are obvious differences between the aesthetics of their fields and those of experienced farmers with years of inherited wisdom. The Cuban farmers we met take great pride in the appearance of their plots, and for tourists appearance is a significant selling point. In both countries, the larger the profits generated by sustainable farms, the stronger the case for more alternatives to industrial agriculture. On the last day of our research trip, shortly after New Year’s Day, we took the public bus to Humberto’s farm and heard his band play songs about seed sharing and agriculture. He and his band use their music, as shown on the Goldman Prize website, for outreach and education.19 Conclusion: A Call for Exchange Individuals and small groups can begin to heal historic wounds between two countries—through common experiences, work, and dialogue. I came back to the U.S. enriched beyond measure, not by internalizing the policies of agriculture over the last century or even what might make an organopónico movement run better, but by human exchanges and in-person meetings. We should invent ways to enable visitors who are prepared to listen and learn to go to Cuba, as well as ways to bring farmers and technicians from Cuba to work in the U.S. South. The dialogue of resistance to imperialism in Cuba can help inform the politics of the U.S. sustainable agriculture movement. And with political and economic changes imminent in Cuba, there are lessons to be learned from U.S. organizations confronting corporate agriculture. It would be tragic if loosened commercial restrictions in Cuba resulted in planting an agribusiness model there that we are desperately trying to get away from in our own country. As Fernando Funes put it, the inclusion of small farmers through redistribution of resources "makes them critical actors in the new reconfigured economy."20 Cuban people, particularly rural people, are the true wealth of the island. Most are literate, savvy about change, and have developed opinions about workable solutions. The potential for exchange between Cuba and the U.S. South offers a collective possibility for agricultural sustainability, an exchange that must overcome boundaries between nations.

#### opening up cuba to outside investment is key to agricultural sustainability

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(M. Dawn, “Cuban Sustainability: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Agriculture and Energy” per Presentation for the Western Political Science Association Portland, OR, March 21-24, 2012, http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/kingmdawn.pdf)//HA

The “special period in peacetime” transformed Cuban agricultural practices toward a more sustainable, organic, low-input system. However, from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, Cuban agricultural outputs began decreasing. Sugar production went from around 8.4 million tons per year in 1990 to a meager 1.5 million tons by 2007-2008 (Elledge 2009). Given the goals of the “special period” to decrease monoculture practices and increase food production, this statistic may not be all that surprising, yet total agricultural production fell 22% from 2000-2005 (Nova-Ganzález 2006) while basic food production declined another 8% from 2007-2008 (Elledge 2009). Further, Cuban dependence on U.S. food imports increased from $4.3 million in purchases in 2001 to $340 million in 2006 (Alvarez 2004, 1; Weissert 2011)1 , and urban agricultural plots decreased from 26,600 in 1997 to 9744 by 2000 (Premat 2005, 154-155)2 . Certainly, the decrease in sugar production is attributable to more than just increasing basic food production. In the early 2000s, the Castro government shut down half of the countries’ 156 sugar mills due to deteriorating infrastructure (Elledge 2009). A lack of national capital has led to many infrastructure problems throughout Cuba, but the disappearance of the sugar industry, once the cause of Cuba’s depleted soil conditions and lack of diverse food production, may lead to even more economic vulnerability for the country. Most of Cuba’s electric cogeneration is coupled with sugar production. A decrease in sugar production equates to a heavier reliance on fossil fuels, something Cuba does not want and cannot afford. With global sugar prices on the rise, partially due to an increase in world demand for sugarcane ethanol, Cuba can use what it learned in the “special period” to produce more sustainable sugarcane. Nicholas Elledge (2009) from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, argues that by “using state of the art technology, a sugar mill can generate over 10 times the electricity needed for its own operation…roughly equivalent to adding 4 power plants to the island” and that “an action as simple as modernizing the existing mills would… represent more than a 50% increase…to the system’s power capacity.” Given Cuba’s dire need for capital and the fact that food production has decreased over the past decade anyway, one means to achieving Cuba’s goal of self-sufficiency could be increasing sugar production. This, of course, requires opening the market up to partial outside investment – an institutional change that may also aid in increasing total food production.

#### the plan saves the Cuban model and applies it to the US

American investment allows Cuban farmers to explore new techniques like using plants as natural pesticides

no incentive to invest now bc of laws that prevent return on investment

Shkolnick, 12 - J.D. Candidate, Drake University Law School (Jacob, “SIN EMBARGO: n1 THE CUBAN AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES” 17 Drake J. Agric. L. 683, Fall, lexis)

VI. New Opportunities While investment in Cuban businesses and sales or purchases of Cuban products must still move through official channels under the joint venture law or other Cuban programs, the time is ripe for organizations in the United States to begin laying groundwork for closer ties with Cuban agricultural entities. Recent regulatory changes implemented by the U.S. government provide a means for individuals and businesses to begin forming the relationships with their Cuban counterparts that will lead to future trade opportunities. n161 As previously mentioned, recent changes in U.S. policy now allow for any individual in the United States, not simply relatives, to donate money to Cuban citizens, though not to exceed $ 500 for any three month consecutive period, with the only restriction being that the recipient is not an official in the Cuban [\*704] government or the Communist Party. n162 Specifically written into these new regulations is the idea that these remittances may be spent "to support the development of private businesses." n163 A five hundred dollar infusion of capital to support a fledging business or farm can be enormously beneficial when the average monthly salary is only 448 pesos, or approximately twenty dollars. n164 Additional capital will enable small Cuban farms to expand operations by hiring additional help or perhaps purchasing additional farm animals. While purchasing a tractor may seem like an obvious choice for a growing farm, Medardo Naranjo Valdes of the Organoponico Vivero Alamar, a UBPC just outside of Havana, indicated that farm animals such as oxen would remain the preferred choice for the foreseeable future on the small and midsized farms that make up the majority of the newer agricultural cooperatives. n165 Not only do farm animals not require gasoline or incur maintenance costs beyond perhaps an occasional veterinarian charge, their waste can be used as fertilizer. Apart from additional labor, funds provided to agricultural cooperatives could be put to use in developing innovative pest control techniques that do not require the use of expensive pesticides or other chemicals. The Vivero Alamar is currently experimenting with a variety of natural pest control techniques such as introducing plants that serve as natural repellents to insects and the introduction of other insects that feed on harmful pests without harming the crops. n166 Investment in agricultural cooperatives done in this manner will likely fail to see much return on the investment for their foreseeable future, until policies in both the United States and Cuba are changed. n167 For a relatively small sum, American investors will get not only the benefit of a close relationship with a Cuban farm that will become a new source of both import and export business in the future, but potentially gain access to innovative agricultural techniques that could be used in the United States immediately. n168 Because the logistical structure needed to transport goods from large rural farms into city markets remains underdeveloped, urban and suburban agriculture makes up a growing portion of the food produced and consumed in Cuba. n169 As in other countries, the population trends in Cuba have continued to shift away from rural areas to more concentrated urban and suburban areas, with about [\*705] three-fourths of Cubans living in cities. n170 With this shift in population has also come a shift in the country's agricultural system. As of 2007, about 15% of all agriculture in Cuba could be classified as urban agriculture. n171 Not only have agricultural practices changed, but eating habits have as well. Without the Soviet Union to provide a ready source of income and the machinery needed to engage in large-scale livestock production, vegetable consumption has increased dramatically. n172 Nearly every urban area has direct access to a wide variety of locally grown, organic produce. n173 Many of the urban farms in Cuba, including the Vivero Alamar, make use of organoponics, a system where crops are produced in raised beds of soil on land that would otherwise be incapable of supporting intensive agricultural production. n174 Many of these raised beds can be constructed in a concentrated area to support a wide variety of produce, with the typical organoponic garden covering anywhere from one half to several hectares in size. n175 The rise of the organoponic production method was a shift away from the earlier centralized production model employed by the state. It has been supported through intensive research and development by a variety of state agencies, such as the National Institute of Agricultural Science, and continued development has been guided through intensive training and educational programs. n176 The organoponic system is not limited in its application to Cuban urban farms, but maintains potential to be applied worldwide, including in the United States. Urban agriculture in Cuba revitalized and put to use previously abandoned and unused land. A similar approach could be applied to the United States as a means to restore blighted areas. n177 Applying Cuban-derived organoponics in U.S. cities could potentially open up an enormous amount of land that was previously unusable. From a business perspective, investing in an organoponic agricultural program in the United States is also a sound decision since the demand for local produce reached $ 4.8 billion in 2008 and is only expected to grow further, potentially reaching $ 7 billion in 2012. n178 [\*706] In an American city beset with high unemployment such as Detroit, Michigan, for example, investing in urban agriculture could potentially generate as many as five thousand new jobs. n179 By utilizing Cuba's system of organoponics, the need to use expensive and complex farm machinery could be significantly reduced. Already companies in the United States, such as Farmscape Gardens in southern California, recognize what Cuba's organoponic system could achieve and have integrated it into their business practices. n180 Rachel Bailin, a partner in the company, indicated that it was Cuba's organic farming practices that helped inspire them to start a company devoted to urban agriculture. n181 They have already used Cuba's organoponic farming methods to produce more than 50,000 pounds of produce since the spring of 2009. n182 The potential for future growth in this industry is huge, as Farmscape Gardens' current levels of production make it the largest urban agriculture company in the state of California. n183 Cuba not only offers attractive prospects for trading in the future, but methods of agriculture pioneered out of necessity have broad prospects if applied to agriculture in the United States. As the demand for locally grown produce continues to increase, a cost-effective and proven agricultural model like Cuba's organoponic system may be just what is needed to allow for urban agriculture to flourish.

#### access to US markets is the only way for Cuban agriculture to survive

proximity lowers transit costs

**Kost, 4** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, “CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?”

<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf>)

In addition to the above European markets, the successful expansion and viability of Cuba’s organic production may also depend on access to geographically-close, high-income foreign markets, namely the United States and Canada. Currently, Cuban produce is not certified-organic in either of these markets. Only after Cuban products are certified for these countries could Cuba legally export produce labeled organic to these markets. Given that many technical production practices currently followed by Cuban producers are potentially compatible with U.S. certification standards and given Cuba’s prior experience in becoming Swiss-certified, Cuba could be well positioned to meet U.S. certification standards. For the U.S. organic market, in addition to a lifting of the U.S. embargo, Cuba would have to be certified by a USDA-accredited certification program that assures U.S. markets that Cuban products labeled organic meet all National Organic Program standards and regulations under the U.S. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990. If the U.S. embargo on Cuba were lifted, Cuban exports, once certified, could play a significant role in the U.S. organic market. In this current U.S. niche market, production costs are high. Opening the U.S. market would enable Cuba to exploit its significant comparative advantage in this area. This market could become a quick foreign exchange earner for Cuba. The largest barrier Cuba faces in expanding into the U.S. organic market will be meeting U.S. requirements for organic certification. Tapping the U.S. market may create sufficient price incentives for Cuban producers to take the necessary steps to meet the organic standards of other importing countries. Cuba could then expand production of organic produce geared to these specialty export markets. With sufficiently high prices for organic produce, urban labor may remain active in an organic urban gardening sector. Most likely, the viability of a vibrant organic produce production and processing sector in Cuba will depend on Cuba’s gaining access to the large, nearby U.S. market. Without such access, organic-oriented production of horticultural products in Cuba will likely remain a necessity-driven way to produce food for domestic consumption in an environment where other production approaches are just not available.

#### industrial agriculture will collapse—now is key to avoid water scarcity, disease, warming and environmental collaspe

**Wright, 9 -** Deputy Director of Coventry University's Centre for Agroecology and Food Security(Julia, Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in an Era of Oil Scarcity, p. 15-16)

Although successful in enabling the availability of a narrow range of foods to a wide range of people, industrialized and global farming and food systems have a long way to go to be acceptably efficient and effective. They degrade the very natural resource base upon which agriculture (and human life) depends – from soil and water quality to plant DNA structure – and inadequately provide in terms of both quantity and quality. Degradation of the natural resource base There is little contestation over the degradation of the natural resource base. Industrial practices result in vast tracts of degraded land, yield declines, loss of plant and animal species diversity, increase in susceptibility to disease, and other serious side-effects over the medium to long term, and have led to a loss of livelihoods (Tansey and Worsley, 1995; FAO, 1997; Conway, 1998; Pingali and Rosegrant, 1998; Oldeman, 1999; Sustain, 2003; Hole et al, 2005). This is particularly so for marginal lands, where the poor soils cannot sustain mono- cultures of annual crops, and which are more vulnerable to flood and drought (Hazell and Garrett, 2001; McNeely and Sherr, 2001). Environmental degradation is also expensive: even a decade ago, agricultural losses due to land degradation were about $550 million annually (Tansey and Worsley, 1995), and the UN estimates that global income loss due to desertification is $42 billion. Ecologically based, organic farming practices show themselves to be more successful at supporting a broad and adapted diversity of crop species and vari- eties, building soil fertility and plant resistance to disease and infection, and maintaining clean water courses (Greene and Kremen, 2003; SAN, 2003; Marriot and Wander, 2006). Strengthening the natural resource base also enables farms to better withstand external shocks and stresses, including drought and flood (Holt-Giménez, 2002; Lotter et al, 2003; Ching, 2004). Agriculture accounts for 70 per cent of freshwater use globally, and the UN predicts that, by 2025, 38 per cent of the population will have insufficient water supply (compared with 8 per cent in 2008) (Lang, 2008). Organic practices increase water retention capacity and efficiency by improving soil structure and increasing soil life, by cultivating climatically adapted varieties, and by growing polycultures of deeprooting and ground-covering crops. Evidence also indicates that organic farming approaches produce lower greenhouse-gas emissions. The reasons for this are threefold: they avoid ammonium nitrate fertilizer (the production of which was responsible for 10 per cent of Europe’s industrial gas emissions in 2003), they encourage carbon seques- tration through cultivation of deeprooting plants, and livestock’s methane emissions are lower if they are feeding on legume pasture (Hamer and Anslow, 2008).

#### Risk of environmental collapse is real and will cascade---we haven’t crossed the tipping point yet but we’re really close---and, anthropogenic destructions destroys resilience and causes extinction

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Crossing certain biophysical thresholds could have disastrous consequences for humanity

Three of nine interlinked planetary boundaries have already been overstepped

Although Earth has undergone many periods of significant environmental change, the planet's environment has been unusually stable for the past 10,000 years 1, 2, 3. This period of stability — known to geologists as the Holocene — has seen human civilizations arise, develop and thrive. Such stability may now be under threat. Since the Industrial Revolution, a new era has arisen, the Anthropocene4, in which human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change5. This could see human activities push the Earth system outside the stable environmental state of the Holocene, with consequences that are detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world.

During the Holocene, environmental change occurred naturally and Earth's regulatory capacity maintained the conditions that enabled human development. Regular temperatures, freshwater availability and biogeochemical flows all stayed within a relatively narrow range. Now, largely because of a rapidly growing reliance on fossil fuels and industrialized forms of agriculture, human activities have reached a level that could damage the systems that keep Earth in the desirable Holocene state. The result could be irreversible and, in some cases, abrupt environmental change, leading to a state less conducive to human development6. Without pressure from humans, the Holocene is expected to continue for at least several thousands of years7.

To meet the challenge of maintaining the Holocene state, we propose a framework based on 'planetary boundaries'. These boundaries define the safe operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth system and are associated with the planet's biophysical subsystems or processes. Although Earth's complex systems sometimes respond smoothly to changing pressures, it seems that this will prove to be the exception rather than the rule**.** Many subsystems of Earth react in a nonlinear, often abrupt, way, and are particularly sensitive around threshold levels of certain key variables. If these thresholds are crossed, then important subsystems, such as a monsoon system, could shift into a new state, often with deleterious or potentially even disastrous consequences for humans8, 9.

Most of these thresholds can be defined by a critical value for one or more control variables, such as carbon dioxide concentration. Not all processes or subsystems on Earth have well-defined thresholds, although human actions that undermine the resilience of such processes or subsystems — for example, land and water degradation — can increase the risk that thresholds will also be crossed in other processes, such as the climate system.

We have tried to identify the Earth-system processes and associated thresholds which, if crossed, could generate unacceptable environmental change. We have found nine such processes for which we believe it is necessary to define planetary boundaries: climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading (see Fig. 1 andTable).

The inner green shading represents the proposed safe operating space for nine planetary systems. The red wedges represent an estimate of the current position for each variable. The boundaries in three systems (rate of biodiversity loss, climate change and human interference with the nitrogen cycle), have already been exceeded.

In general, planetary boundaries are values for control variables that are either at a 'safe' distance from thresholds — for processes with evidence of threshold behaviour — or at dangerous levels — for processes without evidence of thresholds. Determining a safe distance involves normative judgements of how societies choose to deal with risk and uncertainty. We have taken a conservative, risk-averse approach to quantifying our planetary boundaries, taking into account the large uncertainties that surround the true position of many thresholds. (A detailed description of the boundaries — and the analyses behind them — is given in ref. 10.)

Humanity may soon be approaching the boundaries for global freshwater use, change in land use, ocean acidification and interference with the global phosphorous cycle (see Fig. 1). Our analysis suggests that three of the Earth-system processes — climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle — have already transgressed their boundaries. For the latter two of these, the control variables are the rate of species loss and the rate at which N2 is removed from the atmosphere and converted to reactive nitrogen for human use, respectively. These are rates of change that cannot continue without significantly eroding the resilience of major components of Earth-system functioning**.** Here we describe these three processes.

### 1AC 2

**Advantage two is multilateralism.**

#### Unilateralism will fail—latin America is the key region to begin the transition to multilateralism

Unilat will fail because ideology, corporate and sectional interests and the political system hamper the ability to act

LA key because there are no threats and most countries agree with our end goal even if they don’t like the US and they like Obama

Plan solves Brazilian relations because of agriculture cooperation

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Washington’s relations with Latin America—particularly in terms of the gap between what its policy toward the region is and what it could be—precisely measure the degree to which domestic ideologies, narrow corporate and sectional interests, and a sclerotic political system are hastening the decline of the United States as a global power. As a result, the U.S. is deepening its dependence on unstable policies in order to leverage its dwindling influence in the hemisphere. It is easy to imagine an improved U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America, designed not to advance a set of altruistic ideals but merely to defend its interests—broadly defined to mean stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and commodities—and to achieve what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long advocated: a maximization of U.S. “soft power.” Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion,” through an enhanced understanding and utilization of multilateral institutions, mutually beneficial policies, cultural exchanges, and commercial relations.1 There are no immediate threats to the U.S. in Latin America. A majority of the region’s political elite—even most of its current govern- ing leftists—share many of the same values the United States claims to embody, even more so following the election of the first African-American president, who is wildly popular in Latin America. As a result, there is no other place in the world that offers U.S. president Barack Obama the opportunity to put into place the kind of intelligent foreign policy that he and his closest advisors, such as United Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of U.S. prestige—one that would both improve Washington’s ability to deploy its many competitive advantages, while removing key points of friction. Here’s what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede to longstanding Brazilian demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to Brazilian com- modities, especially soy and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol. It would yield on other issues that have stalled the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those infected with the HIV virus. Such concessions would provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be meaningless without Brazil, South America’s largest and most dynamic economy. The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombia—including recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—who is entering the last year of his second and last term—has become the spokesperson for the collective discontent, an indication of his country’s regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-to-be post-Lula Brazil might find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and toward the United States. Washington would also drop the five-decade-old trade embargo on Cuba, thus burying a Cold War relic that continues to tarnish the U.S. image. Normalizing relations with Cuba would create an additional enticement for Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest in Cuba and is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market. Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even as it set up a de facto arrangement with Brazil to administer the region. This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, it would mean leashing the quasi-privatized “democracy promotion” organizations—largely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run by the International Republican Institute—that have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admitted—they fund oppositional “civil soci- ety” groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to menace Left govern- ments throughout the region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2 Similar destabilization efforts tried to topple Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards. It would be easy for the Obama administration to rein these groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable. Washington would also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed “War on Drugs,” as Latin America’s leading intellectuals and policymakers—including many former presidents—are demanding; in the last few months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and heroin.3 The U.S. would renew its assault weapons ban, as Mexico—battered by over five thousand narcotics-related murders a year, many of them committed with smuggled U.S. guns—is begging. It could also pass meaningful immigration reform, providing a path to U.S. citizenship for the millions of undocumented Latin Americans, mostly from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andes, but also Brazil. Such a move would go a long way toward improving relations with south- ern neighbors. It would also be good domestic politics for the Democrats, guaranteeing the loyalty of the Latino vote in 2012 and moving Texas, by creating millions of new vot- ers, closer to swing-state status. It could also provide progressives and the Democratic Party with a real wedge issue: Catholics, increasingly pulled into the con- servative camp by issues such as abortion and gay rights, overwhelmingly favor immigration reform. Any one of the above steps would go far in reestablishing U.S. legitimacy in Latin America. Taken together they could serve as a diplomatic revolution, one which would not weaken U.S. power but consolidate it much the way the Good Neighbor Policy did, allowing Washington to project its power in the region through stable multilateral mechanisms freed from the burdens of confrontation and militarism. A retooled FTAA, updated for the post-Great Recession world and stripped of the ideologi- cal baggage of failed neoliberal globalization, might provide a blueprint for a sustainable regional economy, one that balances national development and corporate profit.4 And like the Good Neighbor Policy, a reinvigorated hemispheric diplomacy could serve as a model for the rest of the world, a design for a practical twenty-first century multilateralism, capable of responding to transnational problems—both those that concern liberals, such as climate change, poverty, and migration, and those that concern conservatives, such as crime and ter- rorism—while respecting, at least rhetorically, the sovereignty of individual nations. In short, the Western Hemisphere offers an unparalleled opportunity to realize the vision of Barack Obama’s September 2009 address to the United Nations—hailed by many as a clarion call for a new internationalism—to, in his words, “embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”

#### cuba stands out as a blatant affront to the multilateral system—plan is necessary and sufficient

The UN voted against it hella times

We have relations with similar nations (china, Saudi Arabia etc.)

this is all amplified by our cuban transition advantage

we solve even if cuba puts up internal barriers

Conditioning on Democracy is bad because it is imposes it which fails and looks terrible—trade is better for democracy

Cuba probably won’t reciprocate—it’s our fault

Embargo just legitimizes the failing regime

Embargo definitionally fails because it doesn’t have international support

Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//SJF

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo 5 - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towards Cuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy. Policy and National Interest Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7 The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15 By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. A History of Anger and Distrust After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20 Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26 Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries. It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15 option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba. Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security. In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.

#### cuba is the key test case for multilateralism

historic ties

Allows north korea and iran to see the positive benefits of engagement

Human rights and democracy can’t be forced but the plan solves

Econ addon—4.84 billion dollars

Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>)//NG

Conclusion The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies. In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52 At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Unilateralism fails and triggers every impact—Mulitlateralism is key

Economic collapse

Nuclear proliferation

Terrorism

Water,

AIDS,

mass migration of people,

desertification,

poverty,

hunger,

disease

**Montalván, 10** - a 17-year veteran of the U.S. Army including multiple combat tours in Iraq, master's of science from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism (Luis, “Multilateralism is Essential for Peace in the 21st Century” Huffington Post, 4/23, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/luis-carlos-montalvan/multilateralism-is-essent_b_550332.html>)

Unilateralism is the wrong approach for American Diplomacy. There is nothing to suggest its efficacy since 9/11. There is nothing to suggest its usefulness for future conflict. In allowing the US to go it alone, America's partners and allies risk the havoc and catastrophic consequences that will accompany "Imperial Overstretch." The residue of overstretch will include loss of US leadership in the world, an economy whose decline affects billions of dollars in international markets, and certainly emboldens rogue states. The whole world will pay the price if we let unilateralism pervade this century. As the bloodiest 100 years in recorded history, the 20th Century is replete with examples of how policy and practice intersect to foment war. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the constantly mutating dynamic of terrorism inform our current, dangerous reality. Amidst this backdrop of destruction, there are lessons for those who are looking for them. Seeds of peacemaking and conflict resolution were planted which we must germinate in order to halt and then reverse the trend toward violence and chaos. Perhaps the 21st Century could be the first 100 years in which nations invest more in building peace than in making war. In the 20th Century, local conflicts ignited global tensions and genocide on an unprecedented scale, costing incalculable life and treasure. The two world wars and other explosive conflicts erupted over such issues as ethnic disputes, the securing of natural resources, corporate interests, ideology and religion. The international business of war produced economies of scale prompted by the industrial, technological, and communications revolutions. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife in Sarajevo by anarchist Gavrilo Princip was the spark that ignited WWI. In time, some 15 million people would be killed. The sheer brutality of that war led Woodrow Wilson to issue his "Fourteen Points" in 1918, which included the establishment of a League of Nations "for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Just like our present-day difficulties in pursuing compromise, the US Congress politicized the concept, bucked the President, and did not support that initiative. The subsequent failure of the League of Nations to prevent WWII may have galvanized our culture's distrust of multilateralism. Throughout the 20th Century and until today, nations and other entities have invested precious financial, intellectual, social, institutional and political capital into arming themselves with weaponry, instead of building their capacity for peace. Technologies change and improve with increasing rapidity, but those advances have included improvements in how to kill more people more efficiently and with smaller devices. WWII was the shining example of multilateralism and its power. Vietnam and Korea were examples of its limitations. South Africa and India demonstrated that the support of the international community could enable countries to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. All these contribute and form the basis of the state of nations today. The 20th Century left us at a crossroads: will we perpetuate the machinery and culture of war or surpass our greatest dreams by encouraging and enforcing peace policies and practices worldwide? The 21st Century began ominously with the attacks of September 11, 2001, which ushered in a new era of US foreign policy and global response to war, conflict and terrorism. Rather than engage a sympathetic world in developing multilateral and inclusive strategies similar to the precursors to the 2003 Iraq War and as was done before the Persian Gulf War, the US squandered its global capital to pursue "pre-emptive" unilateral military action. The equal and increasingly matching reaction is a global culture of military aggression and war. The resulting disintegration of the international community contributed to the most serious economic disaster since the Great Depression. Already struggling to survive amidst broken economies, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and global terrorism strains multilateralism when it should embolden it. If it is true that every weapon invented is eventually used, we have much to fear if we do not reverse this lethal trend. Since national conflicts frequently spill over into regional and world-wide conflict, multilateral organizations have been very strong supporters of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Even the US found a way to first investigate and then come to terms with its terrible policy of putting Japanese-Americans in internment camps during WWII and apologized and paid reparations to survivors and their children. There were important Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, supported by the international community. Victims and perpetrators of Apartheid who participated in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions demonstrated in compelling ways the healing and restorative power of those gatherings. Perhaps more importantly, they showed the world that a nonviolent response to unthinkable oppression and injustice can foster the peaceful development of a society intent upon making amends for the past and embarking upon a brighter, shared future. Since conflict-resolution and peacemaking at the local or national level work, why not apply it multilaterally? Concerned about the resurgence of unilateralism in the US's current Marjeh and Kandahar operations in Afghanistan, former Assistant Secretary of State Gene Dewey recently noted that "it's been very lonely being a leading multilateralist in Washington over the last nine years. Too few policy-makers have sensed where our unilateralism has led, and is leading." Saudi Arabia and other authoritarian Islamic countries generated the seeds that not only birthed the terrorists who carried out 9/11, but also attacks in Madrid, London, Mumbai and Chechnya. No matter where terrorists are determined to attempt to disrupt the lives of others, it's time for countries to realize that the only way to confront contemporary terrorism is through multilateralism. This must be a multilateralism that is thoroughly infused with peacemaking and conflict-resolution, instead of only "joint forces." At this crossroads, we can use the knowledge economy, social network and the international community to turn the rhetoric of hope into reality. We sit upon an historical precipice of policies and practices of sustainable, culturally responsive peace-building and violence prevention within and beyond our borders. Despite their faults, the institutions set up after in response to WWII (UN) and the Cold War (NATO) can be the 21st Century's vehicles for peace. We can use those instruments of multilateralism to build the peacekeeping, disaster relief, and conflict resolution forces that bring countries together. "Actually, I believe we have strategically shifted from that of a global war on terror (GWOT) to containing violent extremism (CVE). That said, the reason extremists do what they do is because they recruit from amongst the most desperate people on the earth. And, the reasons for desperation are strategic---but not necessarily military in nature. In fact, we have the capability to wage peace that is just as sophisticated as our capability to make war. Water, AIDS, mass migration of people, desertification, poverty, hunger, and disease---What would happen if our National Security Strategy became a multilateral one of economic engagement, and used the brain power and resources available to mitigate these issues?" -- Lt. Col. Matthew Canfield, U.S. Army (Currently on his second tour in Iraq) Concerns over economic stability, limited resources and security have divided us. Now is the time to create rather than divide common ground.